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This paper investigates competing influences of display content and clutter on pilot performance during 
flight guidance and target acquisition phases of air-to-ground targeting missions.  Based on interviews with 
F/A-18 pilots, a cognitive process model is presented to help understand how pilots use and transition 
between internal and external sources of information to support decision-making and aircraft control.  
Experiments were conducted in which subjects flew targeting missions using a flight simulator connected 
to the Navy’s FalconView moving-map.  In one experiment, subjects referred to three versions of the 
display: 1) a detailed map overlaid with critical mission symbology, 2) the map only, and 3) mission 
overlays only.  Flight guidance and target acquisition performances were best with the overlays-only 
display.  Performance was comparable or worse with the combination display and significantly worse with 
the map only, suggesting that the distraction of map clutter countered the benefits of map content. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A critical issue in military aviation is the pilot’s ability to 
transition between internal (head-down, instrument-driven) 
and external (head-up, out of the cockpit) guidance.  Military 
pilots interviewed for this project reported difficulties during 
this transition, particularly during time-critical, air-to-ground 
missions such as Close Air Support (CAS) and Forward Air 
Control (FAC). 
Air-to-ground missions require precise flight guidance to 
reach the target area and timely, accurate target acquisition to 
search for, locate, and identify the target.  These mission 
phases are interdependent: errors during flight guidance may 
result in failure to acquire the target; conversely, flight 
guidance is a series of target acquisitions as a pilot searches 
for “lead-in” features along the route (Conejo and Wickens, 
1997).  Flight guidance is supported by a map or electronic 
moving-map display (internal guidance cues), while target 
acquisition relies on intelligence – often communicated by 
troops on the ground (e.g., FAC-G) or other aircraft (FAC-A) 
– and focuses on external cues.  The pilot must correlate 
internal and external guidance cues throughout the mission – a 
process termed navigational checking (Wickens and Long, 
1994) – with the focus on external cues commanding more 
attention as the target area approaches. 
The Navy has used the cockpit moving-map display as a 
situational awareness tool for over a decade.  Current systems 
display raster images, such as scanned charts and satellite 
imagery.  Future systems will use vector databases in which 
individual map features can be manipulated, allowing the 
display to be customized and queried (Lohrenz, et al., 1997).  
As new data becomes available, there is a tendency to present 
everything that might be of interest.  These new displays 
introduce human factors issues concerning the pilot’s ability to 
access and interpret the displayed information.  Many studies 
have linked display complexity to pilot performance (e.g., 
Aretz, 1988).  Display “clutter” – including unwanted noise 
and overcrowding of otherwise important information – is 
thought to disrupt a pilot's visual attention, resulting in greater 
uncertainty about target locations.  A premise of this paper is 
that display clutter can hinder a pilot’s ability to correlate 
internal and external guidance cues. 
Three F/A-18 pilots were interviewed to discuss how the 
moving-map display supports their missions and how it could 
be improved (Lohrenz, 2003).  The pilots identified the 
moving-map as one of several channels of information they 
use to make decisions during time-critical air-to-ground 
missions.  Figure 1 presents a cognitive process model 
developed from these interviews to help visualize how pilots 
integrate the often-disparate sources of information to support 
decision-making and aircraft control.  The model includes 
1) the pilot’s preconceived mental model of the mission; 2) a 
2D internal visual channel (moving-map, flight instruments); 
3) a 3D external visual channel (real-world) supplemented by 
a head-up display (HUD); and 4) an aural channel for radio 
communications (e.g., with a FAC).  The proposed model 
reinforces the importance of a pilot’s ability to transition 
between internal and external guidance.  Clutter in any of 
these information channels is expected to hinder the pilot’s 
ability to correlate cues, impeding mission success. 
The next sections present an experiment to investigate 
competing influences of display content and clutter on a 
pilot’s ability to correlate internal and external cues, measured 
by subjects’ performance and workload during flight guidance 
and target acquisition phases of a simulated air-to-ground 
targeting mission using three moving-map displays (figure 2): 
a. Combination display: a topographic map with graphic 
overlays of flight path and target location, 
b. Map-only display: the topographic map with no overlays, 
and  
c. Overlays-only display: the mission-specific graphic 
overlays with no underlying map. 
 
Figure 1. Cognitive process model of pilot integrating various channels of information 
 to support decision-making and aircraft control. 
 
 
a)   b)   c)  
Figure 2.  Three experimental display cases:  a) combination; b) map only; and c) overlays only. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Twelve volunteers (nine male, three female) were 
recruited from the Naval Research Laboratory Mapping, 
Charting and Geodesy Branch.  Two participants held a pilots’ 
license and three had flight simulator experience.  Participants 
ranged in age from 24 to 52, with a mean age of 37.8. 
A laptop running Microsoft Flight Simulator 2002 
(FS2002) generated flight scenes.  Participants controlled 
pitch, roll, and throttle with a joystick.  To maximize the 
simulator’s outside view, the instrument panel was not 
displayed.  Instead, a digital readout of latitude, longitude, 
altitude, heading, and airspeed was provided at the top of the 
display, along with an analog compass.  The simulator scene 
was set for afternoon in Waimea Canyon, Kauai, with 
unlimited visibility, no precipitation and no winds.  Since most 
subjects had little to no flying experience, the aircraft was set 
to the relatively stable, easily controlled Cessna 172. 
A second laptop running the Navy’s FalconView program 
generated a moving-map.  The two laptops were linked via 
serial cable, and software was written to send position 
information at a rate of 1 Hz from FS2002 to FalconView, 
such that the moving-map was controlled by FS2002.  For the 
map-only and combination displays, a 1:25,500 scale 
topographic chart of Kauai was displayed track-up.  For all 
three displays, a triangular icon represented the aircraft’s 
position, and a “breadcrumb trail” indicated where the aircraft 
had already flown. 
Each subject flew one mission per test case.  For each 
mission, subjects were given two primary flight guidance 
tasks: stay alive (i.e., don’t crash) and stay on the planned 
route.  Subjects’ primary target acquisition tasks were to stay 
alive and to find and identify a target (described below) as 
quickly as possible, following instructions given 2 km from 
the target.  Subjects were told there would be one real target 
and one false target on each mission.  They were to search for 
and say the name of the real target (e.g., “tank”) as soon as 
possible and simultaneously type “o” on the laptop.  The “o” 
was recorded to time the subject’s target acquisition task (from 
the time at which target instructions were given).  If the 
subject identified the correct target, the mission was complete.  
If not, the subject was told to keep searching.  Secondary tasks 
for both phases were to maintain altitude (specified at mission 
start) and airspeed (between 80-160 knots). 
One of three real targets was included in each scene: a 
tank, jeep, or fuel truck.  A car was included as the false 
target.  All four vehicles were of similar size and camouflage 
color, so subjects had to scan the scene carefully to find the 
real target.  Three route/target pairs were prepared to minimize 
subjects’ familiarity with the routes and targets.  The fuel 
truck was the target for route 1, the jeep for route 2, and the 
tank for route 3.  However, subjects were told that any target 
might be found on any route.  Prior to starting the experiment, 
subjects flew a training mission that included all three targets 
plus the false target.  Subjects could repeat this training as 
often as they wanted before starting the experiment. 
Subjects were debriefed after each mission (including 
training).  They rated their workload for each phase from 
1 (easy) to 10 (impossible), based on a modified Bedford scale 
(Roscoe and Ellis, 1990).  Next, subjects prioritized the cues 
they relied on to accomplish each phase.  Valid cues included 
the outside view, instrument readings, topographic map (if 
shown), mission overlays (if shown), and FAC instructions 
(provided by the experimenter).  Subjects were encouraged to 
take a break between missions, if needed.  Most completed the 
experiment in one sitting, which lasted approximately 35 min. 
Independent variables for this experiment were subject, 
display type, and route/target pair.  Dependent variables were 
flight guidance performance (FP), target acquisition 
performance (TP), flight guidance workload (FW), and target 
acquisition workload (TW), calculated as follows.  Time and 
aircraft position (latitude, longitude, altitude) were recorded 
by FS2002 once per second.  The first 20 seconds of each 
flight were not recorded, to give subjects time to adjust to the 
simulator settings for that mission.  FP was calculated as the 
root mean squared error (RMSE) between planned and actual 
flight paths during a mission’s flight guidance phase.  TP was 
the time required to find and correctly identify the target.  FW 
and TW were subjectively assessed using the Bedford scale. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
1. The map-only display will result in the worst FP and TP, 
and highest FW and TW, because it lacks flight path and 
target location information, which are expected to be more 
important than the map. 
2a. If map clutter is a significant issue, the overlays-only will 
result in the best FP and TP, and lowest FW and TW, 
since it provides critical mission cues without map clutter. 
2b. If map clutter is not a significant issue, the combination 
display will result in comparable or better FP, TP, FW and 
TW, compared with the overlays-only display. 
3. Subjects will primarily use internal visual guidance cues 
during flight guidance, and external visual cues and aural 
cues (FAC instructions) during target acquisition. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Figure 3 summarizes results for both mission phases. 
 
Flight guidance 
 
A least squares analysis identifies display type as a main 
effect on FP (F(2,20)=14.71, p<0.001).  As expected, the 
map-only display resulted in the worst FP: average RMSE for 
the map-only was more than twice that of the combination, a 
significant difference (t=2.54, p<0.05).  Average FP for map-
only was also significantly worse than for overlays-only 
(t=2.24, p<0.05).  FP was equivalent for combination and 
overlays-only.  Subjects reported no significant differences in 
FW, considered “tolerable” for all cases, on average. 
 
Target acquisition 
 
Two subjects could not find the target.  Since it was 
impossible to measure time-to-target when the target was not 
found, and since neither display type nor route/target was 
common to the two cases, these subjects were considered 
outliers and removed from the population before examining 
TP.  Least squares analysis indicates display type was the only 
main effect (F(2,16)=4.05, p<0.05) for TP.  T-tests show that 
TP with the map-only display was significantly worse than 
with overlays-only (t=2.24, p<0.05), as expected, but only 
somewhat worse than with the combination (t=1.65, p≅0.1).  
Average TP with the combination display was somewhat 
worse than with overlays-only, but this difference was not 
significant (t=1.45, p>0.1).  A T-test revealed a significant 
difference in average TW ratings between the map-only and 
combination displays (t=1.92, p<0.1), suggesting that subjects 
thought they were working harder with the map-only, as 
expected.  No other differences in TW were significant. 
 
Use of internal and external guidance cues 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the guidance cues subjects reported 
using during each mission phase, by display.  For all three 
displays, most subjects relied more on internal cues (moving-
map and instrument readings) during flight guidance than 
during target acquisition.  With the map-only display, most 
subjects referred to the instrument readings for internal cues; 
with overlays-only and combination displays, most subjects 
referred to the moving-map for internal cues.  With all three 
displays, subjects relied much more on external cues and FAC 
instructions during target acquisition than during flight 
guidance.  With combination and overlays-only (but not map-
only), most subjects continued attending to the map during 
target acquisition, suggesting that the overlay information 
supported the transition between internal and external cues. 
 
Figure 3.  Summary of performance and workload results, by mission phase and display type.   
Error bars represent one standard error above / below the mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of subjects reporting use of four guidance cues, by mission phase and display type. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Results support the first hypothesis: the map-only display 
resulted in the poorest performance and highest workload for 
both flight guidance and target acquisition, suggesting that the 
map itself was less important than the mission-specific 
overlays in supporting the simulated air-to-ground mission. 
Flight guidance results support hypothesis 2b: map clutter 
did not appear to be a significant issue during this phase, since 
the combination display did not result in degraded 
performance or increased workload, compared with the 
overlays-only display.   
Conversely, target acquisition results loosely support 
hypothesis 2a: map clutter may have been an issue during this 
phase, as evidenced by the combination display resulting in 
somewhat poorer performance than the overlays-only display, 
although workload was comparable. 
Guidance cue results support the third hypothesis: most 
subjects reported using primarily internal visual guidance cues 
(map and/or instrument displays) during flight guidance, and 
primarily external visual and aural (FAC) cues during target 
acquisition.  It is noteworthy that subjects also reported using 
the moving-map display during the target acquisition phase 
when overlays were displayed (i.e., combination and overlays-
only displays), but not when overlays were omitted (i.e., map-
only display). 
In summary, mission-specific overlays on the moving-
map display provided more important internal visual cues than 
the underlying map for both flight guidance and target 
acquisition.  If the overlays were present (with or without the 
map), performance was best, presumably because pilots had 
the necessary internal guidance cues to supplement their 
external scene.  If the overlays were missing, pilots ignored 
the map display, attended mostly to external and aural cues, 
and exhibited poorer performance in both phases. 
These results suggest that display designers should 
identify and present only the information required to 
accomplish a given task.  Intelligent prioritization of 
information for display will become increasingly important as 
the number of potential sources of information increases.  
Different missions (and mission phases) often require different 
information to support the tasks to be performed, but 
presenting too much information at one time can degrade 
performance.  Displays should provide a “declutter” interface 
to assist pilots in optimizing the display.  Research is still 
needed to determine how best to perform this decluttering. 
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